In 1969, BBC television's popular science and technology program, Tomorrow's World, broadcast an item that looked forward to the introduction of a banking system that would ''usher in [the country's] cashless economy.'' 1 The show's narrative of technological change envisioned point-of-sale terminals in British high street shops linked in real time to a central supercomputer. The basis for the show's prediction was a plan by Britain's biggest bank, Barclays, to have its new nationwide computer banking system in place by 15 February 1971 . Barclays was not alone. Its close competitors, the Midland and the National Provincial, also saw ''Decimal Day''-the day when Britain would decimalize its currency-as the deadline for the real-time computerization of the whole of their branch networks. None of the banks went as far as including point-of-sale terminals in their plans, but each foresaw its own real-time computer linked to a national branch network of intelligent terminal satellites. In all three cases, the US computer manufacturer Burroughs was to provide the banks' real-time systems.
Not untypically for Tomorrow's World, its prediction turned out to be wildly optimistic, but so too were the ambitions of Burroughs and the banks. At the time of the program's broadcast, one bank had already abandoned its project, and relations between the other two and Burroughs were being sorely tested. Real-time banking never materialized in the 1970s, let alone by 1971, and to varying degrees, each project could be considered a failure. In this article, I examine the details of the Barclays' case and its relation to the real-time ideal in order to challenge accepted truths regarding technological innovation in banking and expand the historiography of computing further beyond the bounds of success.
In Computer, their wide-ranging history of the computer, Martin Campbell-Kelly and William Aspray suggest that the exigency for real-time computing in banking originated with the introduction of the automated teller machine (ATM) and that it was inertia from batch-oriented accounting methods that prevented real-time accounting in banking taking place in the 1970s. 2 Elsewhere, overviews of the computerization of retail finance portray it as a staged movement from batch processing in the 1960s to online and then real-time processing in the 1970s and 1980s. 3 Bernardo Bátiz-Lazo and Robert Reid recently began to untangle the links between the ATM and real-time computing in their account of the development of cash-dispensing technology in the UK, 4 but technology's linear progression remains a self-evident truth.
This article argues that a history of computing in banking that includes its failures has a different story to tell, one that highlights the nonlinear nature of technological change and the relevance of technical and social ideals. Drawing upon oral testimonies and archival material, I offer Barclays' perspective on the Barclays-Burroughs real-time project to show how a community made up of Barclays programmers and Burroughs engineers struggled to make the rhetoric of the cashless society a real-time banking reality alongside the bank's existing IBM-based batch-processing developments. I explore the ''interpretive flexibility'' of the real-time concept as ''real time'' was reconfigured as ''on time'' in the face of a number of material and immaterial difficulties. These difficultiesenvironmental challenges at the computer center, delivery delays, cancellations, and manpower shortages-exacerbated the already considerable challenges of real-time software creation and resulted in the project's eventual demise. I conclude by showing how the Barclays-Burroughs community of practice came to terms with the project's unfortunate end by incorporating its failure into a technological discourse that judged the technology of real-time computing for banking and the idea of the cashless society as ''too far ahead of its time. '' The Real-Time Impetus
In the 1950s, escalating volumes of work caused by increased demand for banking services intensified the pressure on British high street banks. Short of space and staff for their branches in London and other major cities, and faced with a shrinking labor pool and rising operating costs, the banks saw the commercial arrival of large-scale electronic computing technology as a solution to their problems. 5 By replacing electromechanical accounting machines in the branches with an automated branch bookkeeping system at a computer center, the banks believed they could continue to provide their current services to an increasing number of customers at a cost they would remain willing to pay. 6 This first wave of automated accounting at the banks' first computer centersoperational from 1961-relied on computer systems that processed customer account updates in batches. This meant that the updates to customer accounts were delivered in bundles by hand or over telephone lines from branches throughout the day and were not processed at the center until later that evening when all entries had been received. Branch staff saw the results of their updates the following morning when they received printed account ledgers and statements.
Although the computer itself processed information quickly, the move from mechanized accounting in the branch to computer accounting at the center actually increased overall processing times. Real-time computing offered the possibility of banishing any delay.
By the mid-1960s, major American and British airline reservation systems had proved that real-time computing was commercially viable. Like American Airlines' pioneering reservations system, SABRE, real-time computing offered the banks immediate updates and information retrieval with the potential for improved management information and business control. 7 In banking, however, real-time computing was still an open frontier. The cachet of realizing the world's first real-time banking system appealed to Barclays at a time when a draft internal memo revealed concern from an unnamed source that the bank was in danger of losing its position as technological pioneer among British banks. 8 The impending decimalization of British currency edged Barclays toward real time. In his 1966 budget, Chancellor of the Exchequer James Callaghan had announced that Britain would convert to decimal currency. Decimal Day, or D-Day as it came to be popularly known, was set for 15 February 1971. 9 The chancellor's announcement gave the state, businesses, and the public five years to prepare for the change from pounds (£), shillings (s), and pence (d) into the new pounds and pennies. The new pound would have the same value as the old, but it would be divided into 100 new pennies rather than 20 shillings, each worth 12 pence.
The government's decision meant a massive forced change for all British businesses. Banks, in particular, were under tremendous pressure to get the conversion right. Decimalization not only meant handling a new currency at the counters in the branch's banking halls, but also necessitated wholesale changes to accounting procedures and back office technologies. Accounting machines, adding machines, ledger books, customer statements, and paper forms all needed to be replaced or converted. Significant costs were associated with replacing and converting existing branch equipment, procedures, and stationery for decimalization, much of which would be redundant after computerization. In 1966, computerized branch accounting in British banking remained a highly localized and selective affair. Of the 2,300
Too Far Ahead of Its Time: Barclays, Burroughs, and Real-Time Banking branches in its national network, Barclays had automated only 100 of its biggest and busiest London branches. These were the branches that were experiencing the greatest shortages of staff and space.
In the computer centers, accounting programs also had to be rewritten and stationery updated for decimalization. However, this conversion of centralized computer center branch accounting programs presented itself as a fairly quick and manageable task. One set of programs at the center did the accounting work for all branches, so a change to these programs would change all the branches in one fell swoop. 10 Conversion of mechanized accounting practices and equipment across an entire branch network was a more complicated proposition. Given the complexity of the change, its associated costs, and the growing inevitability of computerization, it made economic sense for the banks to computerize the accounting of as many of their branches as possible before D-Day.
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Enter Burroughs: Agent of the Future By the mid-1960s, the British banks were predominantly purchasing their computers from IBM. After two initial purchases from British electronics manufacturer-and Barclays' customer-EMI, 12 Barclays looked to IBM for computers to stock its check-clearing center and its second and third branch accounting computer centers. Barclays had initially planned an IBM installation for its fourth branch accounting computer center, but other US office appliance manufacturers were also targeting the UK market, intent on contesting IBM's hegemony as computer supplier to four of the ''Big Five'' British banks. 13 Of these US manufacturers, Burroughs offered an ambitious solution for real-time branch accounting to the largest British banks.
Burroughs was a member of a group of IBM's seven biggest US rivals that the trade press had labeled the ''seven dwarves'' to indicate the comparatively small share they had of the burgeoning computer market in relation to the US giant. 14 Burroughs had established itself in Britain in the 1890s. The company's entrepreneurial founder, William Seward Burroughs, having worked in a bank, knew only too well the tedious repetition that characterized much of a bank clerk's work. He began his company by developing an adding machine that he identified by personal experience as fulfilling a need in the branch bookkeeping process. The company went on to produce a series of small-scale mechanical and electromechanical machines that could be accommodated within a typical office to fulfill a range of banking needs. 15 After World War II, Burroughs invested significantly in electronics and began to expand vigorously. It opened new factories in the UK and relocated its adding machine production facilities from Detroit to Strathleven, Scotland. 16 In 1950 its investment in electronics resulted in the production of a new kind of branch accounting machine called the Sensimatic, which it considered ''the greatest advance in accounting machines in 25 years.'' 17 However, as the 1950s progressed, Burroughs was slower than IBM in making the move from office equipment to business computer supplier. Its first vacuum-tube-based machines sold modestly in the 1950s, 18 and its business computing efforts largely focused on selling equipment that could fit within the confines of a traditional office environment. Of the 10 ''data processing'' products it showcased at the 1959 Business Efficiency Exhibition in London, its 220 ''large-scale computer'' was the only one to find a home in a computer center. 19 Unlike IBM, Burroughs had not been a manufacturer of the tabulators that had acted as a useful stepping stone in the transition from office appliance to business computing manufacturer.
Similar to IBM, however, Burroughs' first inroad into large-scale computing with the British Banks was via check sorter-readers. Lloyds Bank ordered a Burroughs check sorter-reader in 1960 and followed this up with an order for a Burroughs B270 computer in 1962. 20 The Midland ordered 10 Burroughs sorter-readers to be controlled by a Burroughs B370 by 1965. 21 Two years later, Burroughs' check encoding machines, which were used in the branch to print the amount in magnetic ink on checks paid over the counter, had a three-quarters majority share of the British market. 22 Burroughs stepped up its computer sales efforts to the British banks in 1965 by expanding its London sales office and creating a London-Banks office dedicated to serving the needs of the high street banks. Its sales team aggressively went after new business, seeking to persuade the banks to change computer suppliers and buy Burroughs. Burroughs competed on four fronts with IBM and other established computing suppliers. First, it offered to undercut the competition on price.
The appeal of Burroughs' programmable branch terminal, the TC 500, led Barclays to its all-Burroughs solution.
Second, it leveraged its long-standing links with the British banks to promote itself as fully understanding their specific needs. Third, it competed on technical excellence, waxing lyrical about the virtues of its integrated hardware and software developments at the computer center and in the branch. Fourth, it was intent on selling itself as the business automation company of the future, declaring in advertisements in newspapers and trade journals that it was ''bringing business automation to far-sighted companies.'' 23 The B8500 Computer
Burroughs gained its initial real-time experience working as a subcontractor on the Semi-Automatic Ground Environment (SAGE) real-time defense system and several other US government-sponsored projects. To the private sector, it marketed its 500 series machines as online, real-time systems particularly suited to financial applications. 24 The range began with the entry-level B5500, the commercial counterpart of its D825 military real-time machine. At the top of the range was the B8500 supercomputer. Produced by the Burroughs Defense, Space, and Special Systems Group, the B8500's origins were as a high-speed scientific computer for the US Atomic Energy Commission. It shared the integrated modular design found in the B5500, expanding the concept further to offer a maximum of 16 interconnected processors and I/O modules. 25 The B8500 represented Burroughs' biggest and most ambitious system to date, which it set about marketing outside of the defense and space fields, trumpeting it as ''the most powerful computer system ever designed.'' 26 In addition to the American defense contract, Burroughs had secured a US$20 million order from US Steel and a US$15 million order from the University of Wisconsin. 27 Burroughs demonstrated the machine's technical pedigree to senior bank managers, analysts, and programmers who were invited on tours of Burroughs Research Unit in Detroit and installations at US Steel and the North American Air Defense (NORAD) combat operations center inside the Cheyenne mountain near Colorado Springs. 28 At NORAD, Barclays representatives were suitably flattered to have been granted privileged access and impressed by what they saw inside.
At the heart of the complex was a Burroughs behemoth, a D825 multiprocessor computer that used radar and satellite input to make real-time evaluations of incoming threats to the North American continent. 29 Its multiprocessor architecture meant that it offered high performance and boasted nonstop capabilities. This was an important selling point for a complete solution that relied on a single computer at its center. Barclays technicians believed the Burroughs machine offered superior reliability compared to its competitors. 30 The visiting team was also impressed by the synergy between Burroughs hardware and software teams, of which one of the results was an automatic ''self-discovery'' of any changes in hardware configuration at initial program load (IPL). Burroughs appeared technically and organizationally advanced and able to offer machines with superior technology and system reliability to those of the firm's competitors, particularly those from IBM. 31 The D825 was not available commercially, but Burroughs was building a B8500 to order at US Steel to serve as its real-time control system. Barclays' representatives were shown the prototype supercomputer, but they had no way of knowing that the machine they saw ''in bits on the floor'' would never be completed. US Steel continually changed its requirements, and although Burroughs attempted to respond with modifications to increase processing power, 32 the machine was unreliable and Burroughs could not rectify its flaws cost effectively. 33 The TC 500 Intelligent Terminal
It was the appeal of Burroughs' programmable branch terminal, the TC 500, however, that led Barclays to its all-Burroughs solution. 32 The TC 500 offered an intelligent terminal interface to its operator within the branch that was judged by Barclays programmers to be ''streets ahead of anything else at the time.'' 34 Rather than relying on Too Far Ahead of Its Time: Barclays, Burroughs, and Real-Time Banking hardware to control printer positioning, the TC 500 was controlled solely by application programming. 35 This made it incredibly versatile. An operator in the branch could load a TC 500 with programs held on paper tape to perform different branch accounting tasks on the same machine.
36 Figure 1 shows a Burroughs TC 500 together with some paper-tape programs.
The TC 500 was marketed as an intelligent branch terminal when Burroughs management came to understand that the technologies of office appliances and computers were converging. 37 A sophisticated programmable electromechanical machine with three processors, the TC 500 was considered by some to be a computer in its own right. 38 The Financial Times reported one claim that there was the same calculating capacity in this small office machine as there had been in an IBM 1401. 39 Burroughs stressed the TC 500's power in its advertising literature, highlighting its role in a balanced computing system where processing was shared between remote terminal and central computer. 40 Connected to a Burroughs large-scale computer, a TC 500 could make customer records at the computer center available to the branch in real time.
A Complete Solution
Burroughs extolled the virtues of its intelligent TC 500 terminals for the bank branches and its B8500 computer in the computer center and promised that this combination would be powerful enough to handle a bank's entire branch accounting needs. Burroughs offered Barclays all the computing capacity it would need for its own realtime national computing network comprising a Burroughs B8500 at the center and a network of Burroughs TC 500 terminals in the branches. Burroughs claimed the system could provide an up-to-date response to any branch transaction within two and a half seconds and handle a million of these transactions every hour. 41 Burroughs' system was also half the price of that proposed by IBM. 42 Thus, Barclays dropped IBM in favor of Burroughs as the new supplier of its computing technologies that would decimalize most of its branch accounting. On 2 March 1967, it placed an £11.5 million order with Burroughs for one B8500, priced at £4.5 million, and 2,300 TC 500 branch terminals. 43 Another order from another British bank, the National Provincial, quickly followed. Then, in February of the following year, Figure 1 . A Burroughs TC 500 on display at Barclays Group Archives.
April-June 2012 both banks were followed by the Midland. The Midland had previously ordered TC 500s worth £6 million from Burroughs for its branch network, but as relationship difficulties with British computer manufacturer English Electric Leo Marconi came to a head, it switched computer suppliers and purchased a supercomputer from Burroughs. 44 The two remaining big British banks, Lloyds and the Westminster, stayed committed to IBM and, to differing degrees, committed to batch processing.
Proud of its orders, Burroughs made sure the rest of British business knew about them. It published the following newspaper quote as a stark advertisement in the Financial Times on 22 May 1967: ' 'In just over a week Burroughs Machines, which has not previously appeared to be a major force in the U.K. computer market, has announced orders worth more than £20 m from three of the five biggest British clearing banks.'' Although Barclays had done little business with Burroughs up until this point, preferring to partner with NCR for its electromechanical bookkeeping machines, 32 Burroughs' real-time computing offered Barclays the opportunity to further its ambitions to be a technological innovator. It reckoned its new system would be the largest real-time banking system anywhere in the world. 45 Tomorrows' World had portrayed cash as outdated and dangerous, and now Barclays wanted batch-mode, computerized branch accounting to look as old fashioned.
Tomorrow's banking world was still years away, however. Lead times from order to delivery of large-scale computers were still typically 18 months to two years, and installation of the Burroughs' B8500 super computer was promised for the first half of 1969. 46 In the meantime, Barclays looked for a space to house its new computer and began to source the analysts and programmers that would realize its real-time banking vision.
Close to the Machine
In the spring of 1967, two programming teams were assembled. The first was an applications team that would write the real-time branch accounting applications; the second was a small technical team assembled, in the words of one of its members, in order to ''get to grips with [the B8500] in its technical glory.'' 38 This team consisted of the bank's most experienced and skilled programmers drawn from Barclays' other computer projects. These programmers, who had been bank clerks five years previously, were complemented by a number of computing outsiders recruited for their technical specialties.
The technical team's brief was to understand what could be done with the Burroughs machines by working alongside Burroughs engineers ''close to the machine'' and advising the applications team accordingly. The machines the team had to understand were the Burroughs large-scale B8500 computer and the smaller-scale TC 500s that would be installed in the branches. Getting close to the B8500 presented a considerable challenge given that the machine would not be ready for delivery for another two years, 38 which was not an unusual length of time to wait for a large-scale computer. There was no need to wait for the delivery of the Burroughs large-scale computer to make use of the TC 500s, however. The intelligent branch terminals could operate as standalone bookkeeping machines for both decimal and pre-decimal working with some reprogramming. 47 The bank was intent on replacing its nondecimal NCR 160 and 3204 accounting machines with TC 500s as fast as Burroughs could make them available. 48 
Learning in a Community of Practice
Meanwhile, in the first half of 1968, one of Barclays' applications programming team attended a Cooperating Users of Burroughs Equipment (CUBE) meeting in New Orleans, Louisiana. CUBE was a computer user group for Burroughs' customers similar to IBM's Share user group and Guide, an association of IBM's commercial data processing users. CUBE's purpose was to share knowledge, ideas, practices, and programs and to agree upon standards. 49 It was a formal incarnation of what educational theorist Etienne Wenger would consider a ''community of practice. '' 50 At the New Orleans meeting, one Burroughs' representative shared his knowledge that production of the B8500 was delayed and that Burroughs was about to offer Barclays two B6500s instead. Not only was this solution seen as less than satisfactory, the manner in which it had been communicated to the bank was deemed wholly inappropriate. Barclays managers considered
Burroughs' decision to relay something of this magnitude to a chief programmer at a user group meeting rather than communicating it directly to them disrespectful. 51 As a stopgap and peace offering until delivery of the first of the B6500s, Burroughs promised to supply Barclays with a B5500. Barclays managers might not have been happy, but the bank's programmers could at least begin testing. 48 Although some US banks had used the Burroughs B5500, 52 there was little experience of it in Britain. The bank's technical team began working closely with Burroughs engineers, forming a smaller, tightly knit community of practice, to gain experience of the machine's capabilities as quickly as possible. The team soon realized both the B5500 and the TC 500s were sophisticated machines, but that Burroughs had not yet worked out how they would work in harmony as a real-time system. The B5500's operating system could not handle telecommunications from multiple processors in multiple terminals connected over multiple lines to a multiprocessor computer. The real-time systems up to this pointfrom both IBM and Burroughs-had used dumb rather than intelligent terminals. The sophistication of the TC 500 terminals added an extra layer of complexity.
Then, a first bombshell exploded. The Burroughs engineer who was to design and write the software for two-way data communication between the TC 500s and the B5500 computer left Burroughs. And Burroughs had no one available to replace him.
The Burroughs' programming job was picked up in 1968 by Barclays' employee David Parsons, who had retrained from his role as a bank clerk to become a programmer of the EMI computers at Barclays' first computer center. 53 His new team leader, Stan Gray, had faith that he could meet the challenge of getting the TC 500s to communicate effectively with the B5500 computer. The branch accounting programs for the EMI computers and IBM System/360s at the bank's other computer centers had been written in machine code and assembly language. The application programs for the new Burroughs real-time branch accounting system were to be written in Cobol, which was supported by the B8500. However, to get the TC 500 machines in the branch to communicate with the central computer required coding at a lower level. Although the B8500 and B5500 were in the same Burroughs ''family'' of computers, they were not machinelanguage compatible like the IBM System/ 360. Instead, compatibility was achieved through the use of higher-level languages. 54 All the system software for the B8500 was written in Algol, 55 so Parsons set about learning Algol from the Burroughs-supplied manuals. He worked with another computer specialist Barclays had recruited from outside the bank, Peter Atkins, and sharing a strong work ethic, both men were soon deeply immersed in the workings of the TC 500 and the B5500. One weekend the two of them took a complete program listing back to Parson's house in Barnet, North London, and worked their way through it. Working without Burroughs' support and unable to make sense of the logic behind the data communications, they decided to rewrite relevant sections of the operating system so that they could understand it. 38 They rewrote what they could and then arranged for it to be typed up into punched cards the following week. Prior to one scheduled test session on the B5500, the two Barclays men approached Peter Groves, the Burroughs engineer responsible for the machine, and explained the situation to him. Parsons remembered saying, You know we've been having trouble trying to make the telecommunications stuff work. Now Peter [Atkins] and I have written a whole new chunk of code for the operating system, and in our session this morning I'm going to recompile the operating system to our version. I know that means that because it's not Burroughs-written amendments, I get no support; so I don't expect any support. But I thought I ought to tell you that's what I'm going to do. 38 Parsons recalled that the Burroughs engineer smiled and said, ''Don't be daft, of course I'll support you. Let's see how it goes.'' The three men worked together to recompile the operating system and then reinitiated the machine with the test TC 500s in place. They started the test telecommunications programs and a couple of seconds later the TC 500s started to chatter. The bank's programmers experienced that sense of the mastery and exhilaration of programming close to the machine described by Sherry Turkle in The Second Self and Steven Levy in Hackers. 56 The informal collaboration between the Barclays-Burroughs team members had succeeded in getting the TC 500s to talk to the Burroughs computer. After the test, Parsons and Atkins submitted their changes to Burroughs so that their amendments could be incorporated formally into an operating system release. When the release was issued, the programmers were proud of a comment in the B5500 master control program that acknowledged their contribution to the code. 38 
The Interpretive Flexibility of ''Real'' Time
The TC 500s might have been talking to the B5500, but getting them to update customer accounts in ''real time'' was still a long way away. Challenges associated with real-time updating, including implementing restarts and recoveries, also had to be tackled. Furthermore, the concept of real time had been open to several interpretations. For example, US military projects for flight simulation and air defense interpreted ''real time'' as an immediate response without delay. For the American Airlines' Sabre project, ''real time'' was considered to be a response of less than three seconds, and this was the paradigm used by the Communications of the ACM when it reported that the newly announced Barclays-Burroughs system could provide an up-to-date response to any branch transaction within two and a half seconds. 57 But pragmatic concerns led Barclays to a more flexible interpretation of the real-time concept, which led to the design of a system that classified branch transactions according to one of three levels, to provide what was classified an ''on-time'' rather than ''real-time'' response.
Gerry Jarvis, the bank's real-time system designer, remembered the response-level classification as follows. The first level consisted of enquiries and urgent amendments. If a clerk in the branch wanted to make an enquiry-a read-only request-a response should be provided straight away. Certain update transactions, such as stopping a check, were classed as urgent amendments that also needed to be done immediately. A second-level response consisted of daily branch accounting entries to customer accounts. These were accumulated and processed when the computer was not busy responding to immediate enquires or updates. The deadline for completing all these entries on the computer would be the end of the day, as it had been in the branch. The third level was account amendmentsfor example, a change of address-for which there was no immediate urgency within the day. These were collected together and done at the same time in a manner akin to batch processing. 58 Progress was being made implementing the on-time design, but work was taking longer than planned and Barclays programmers still faced numerous challenges. Meanwhile, the computer center was throwing up fresh challenges of its own.
A Computer Center in Suburbia
Barclays had quickly settled on an old motorbike warehouse at Harrow Road, Willesden, northwest of London, for its Burroughs Computer Center. 59 Located five miles northwest of London, the center lay at the beginnings of a suburban sprawl that in 1924 the Metropolitan Railway had dubbed ''Metro-land'' to promote suburban development along its extended London underground Metropolitan Line. 60 At 51,000 square feet, the computer center was Barclays' biggest yet, and its first in a suburban as opposed to urban location. The area was home to a mixture of light industrial and residential properties, and consideration had to be given to adequate sound proofing in the center's design lest noise from its standby diesel generator might disturb nearby residents.
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The center's impact on its environment was not Barclays' main concern, however; it was the impact of the environment on the center. Barclays had previously experienced problems providing the right conditions for its large-scale computers, space having been reclaimed from shops, factories, and warehouses. Barclays' check-clearing system in London, consisting of an IBM 1401 and associated check readers, had experienced ''all sorts of faults [ . . .] because the electric switches on the building's lifts were Too Far Ahead of Its Time: Barclays, Burroughs, and Real-Time Banking interfering with the system.'' 62 But this was nothing compared to the problems Barclays experienced with the equipment installed at its Burroughs Computer Center at Willesden.
Burroughs computers and disk drives suffered innumerable problems, and it was difficult to distinguish whether these problems were inherent to the Burroughs equipment or were due to adverse environmental conditions. Many pointed a finger at the computer center's location, sandwiched as it was between a main road at the back and a busy railway junction in front. Vibrations from fully loaded freight trains running past at night could be felt throughout the center. The Burroughs' machines were considered ''very sensitive'' by workers at the center, and the building's vibrations were blamed for a host of failures. 63 There was also a suspicion that other environmental factors, including dust from the road and rail traffic and less than adequate air conditioning, might have been at play as well. 64 Barclays continued to make modifications, including rubber damping for the computer floors, to cater for the site's inadequacies, 65 but it was soon clear that the building's location, and its repurposing from motorcycle warehouse to computer center, had made for a far from perfect computing environment.
The TC 500s in the branch were not without their issues either. Operating as standalone bookkeeping machines, they were initially slower and more troublesome than the older machines that they replaced. 66 The TC 500s were also prone to breakdowns. Barclays' project team advised branches that a 90-day ''running-in period'' was required after which the breakdown rate settled down within acceptable limits. 48 The first branches to be connected to the Burroughs machine at Willesden, in August 1969, suffered terrible processing delays. ''On-time'' processing was carried out in parallel to the branches' normal bookkeeping, but it was far from punctual. The B5500 computer had difficulty operating in batch update mode only, and at one point, rumors circulated at the bank's batch-based IBM computer centers that real-time colleagues at Willesden were doing well as they were ''only 8 days behind with their processing.'' 67 A friendly rivalry was developing between the bank's Greater London Computer Center (GLCC)-its IBM computer center less than five miles away on London's Tottenham Court Road-and the Burroughs computer center at Willesden. Some in the Burroughs' real-time camp began to wonder if there was more than schadenfreude occurring at the GLCC, as rumors began to circulate that IBM was using Burroughs' misfortune to its own advantage in order to plot Burroughs' downfall. 68 This would not have been the first time accusations of this sort had been leveled at IBM-the FUD (fear, uncertainty, and doubt) factor was an effective weapon employed by IBM against its competitors.
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To make matters worse, what had been an interim solution became the only solution in 1969 when Burroughs cancelled its B8500 project. At that point, its offer of two B6500s became the only offer on the table. The B6500 now became the company's flagship machine, and it was billed its ''System for the Seventies.' ' Burroughs had a backlog of 60 firm orders for the B6500, worth a total of US$300 million, but it promised the British banks that they would be among the earliest to receive this system. 70 Nonetheless, it could offer no better estimate than the first of Barclays' two machines being ready for delivery in June 1969. With significant investment already made in the project, Barclays was not about to give up and pressed ahead, so it accepted Burroughs offer of the two B6500s. Burroughs also attempted to broker the same deal with the National Provincial, but the bank pulled out of its commitment to Burroughs large-scale computer, in part due to its impending merger with the Westminster bank, which had invested heavily in IBM. The new National Westminster bank would go forward with a hybrid of IBM computers linked to Burroughs' terminals. The Midland, like Barclays, persevered with its allBurroughs solution. 71 
Failure and Closure
When initial plans for the real-time project had been drawn up midway through 1967, project managers had hoped to link the first branches to the Burroughs machine by August 1969. After this first milestone was reached, they anticipated rolling out realtime automation to the remainder of Barclays' branch network by the end of 1970. However, an announced merger with a smaller bank, Martins, in 1968 added a further 732 branches to Barclays' 2,612. 72 It was clearly impossible to accommodate these extra branches into existing real-time plans. original project plan was achievable. In spite of teething troubles, the connection of the first two branches, Watford Junction in Luton District and Chorleywood in Oxford District, to the Burroughs B5500 computer at Willesden on 9 August 1969, provided the team with a much-needed boost. A number of other teething problems, however, caused those in charge of the project to admit that the branches' initial experiences with the new system were bad. The two branches continued to run their mechanized in-branch bookkeeping in parallel with the new system as Barclays worked with Burroughs to try and iron the problems out.
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Amidst the environmental problems at Willesden and the challenges of real-time programming, Burroughs announced that delivery of the first B6500 would be at first four and then nine months late. It looked unlikely that Barclays would have its B6500 installed and working before October 1970. Burroughs promised Barclays another B5500 free of charge, 74 but as replacements for the B6500s, the B5500s were woefully inadequate. Compared to the specifications for the never-to-materialize B8500, they were chronically underpowered. Barclays had connected 11 branches to the first B5500 and envisaged connecting only another 24 more to that machine before it would be running at its capacity. A quick calculation estimated that Barclays would need 100 B5500s to cope with all its branches. 32, 51 Even with a B6500 installed and running by October 1970, Barclays' best estimate was that there would be 50 more branches on that machine before D-Day. Although Barclays' programming manager insisted, ''[t] here is nothing wrong with the Burroughs system as such, and when installed it will provide us with the most up-to-date computer network in the world,'' it was clear that the project's deadline was not going to be met.
The all-important D-Day was recast as an interim milestone by which time all the branch accounting equipment not suitable for decimal conversion had to have been replaced with Burroughs TC 500s. Overall project completion was now shifted to the winter of 1971, with the technical team anticipating working flat out once the B6500s were delivered. 48 With D-Day fast approaching, Barclays' main efforts were now redirected toward the IBM installation at the GLCC, where IBM personnel were only too happy to provide assistance and another System/360 machine. 32 Computer analysts and programmers (CAP) were brought in to begin work writing a ''version 2b'' of Barclays' branch-accounting programs to run on the IBM mainframes. The new programs improved the system's speed, capacity, reliability, and security, but updates to customer accounts would still be made in batch overnight. 32, 51, 75 By D-Day, rather than acting as the hub for the entire branch network, the Burroughs computer center at Willesden was serving only 30 bank branches and was limping along in batch mode rather than in real time. The Barclays-Burroughs relationship had gone sour, and Barclays' senior management was looking for a way out while trying to keep the bank's dignity intact. For a while Barclays kept the Burroughs B6500s-which were upgraded to B6700s-at Willesden and attempted to get them to operate like IBM's System/360 machines. CAP produced a System/360 emulation program for the Burroughs computers, but predictably, it ran slowly. 32 Plans to install any further largescale Burroughs computers were shelved, and almost all effort was directed back to the well-established batch mode of working on IBM machines. Only a small programming team continued working on the Burroughs' real-time project. 32, 38 Barclays was not the only British bank that suffered with Burroughs. The Midland suffered too. Its optimistically named Project 70, later retitled the Online Computer System, was plagued with similar setbacks, but it persevered after Barclays cancelled its project. 32 In the US, Trans World Airlines (TWA) was also experiencing major difficulties with Burroughs. The machines Burroughs had delivered to run TWA's realtime airline reservations system were underpowered and unreliable. The Burroughs' system was never operational, and TWA sued the company while it replaced its machines with high-end System/360 computers from IBM. 76 Of all the British banks, only Lloyds managed to have all its branches connected to a computer by 15 February 1971 . 77 Lloyd's achievement was significant, but Barclays technicians were keen to point out that it wasn't the online, real-time system to which Barclays had aspired. 32 Lloyds had decided to go for the more achievable goal of an online system where the branch was connected to the computer center via telephone line and entries were made and stored on the computer during the day. Updates were still applied in batch overnight rather than in real time as the clerk entered them in the branch. 78 Lloyds' task was also made all the more manageable because it was the smallest of the Big Five banks, both in terms of its assets and branch network. And of all the banks, only Lloyds had chosen an all-IBM solution. It had remained faithful to IBM as its computer supplier all the way through the 1960s and, as a result, enjoyed some stability during a period of continual technical change. Unlike Barclays and Midland, the stability of this relationship also provided for a long and continuous period of learning for those involved on both sides.
By 1972, Barclays' real-time project was beginning to look like a failure. On 15 December 1972, Barclays publicly announced that its remaining large-scale Burroughs computers were to be replaced by IBM machines. 79 Salvaging what it could from the project, Barclays didn't sever all links with Burroughs and the real-time project, however. It kept the technically elegant TC 500s in the branches linked to IBM computers at the GLCC and Willesden. This meant that, in part at least, the project could be considered a success. The majority of the money Barclays had invested in the real-time project had been on the TC 500 terminals in the branches, and these terminals remained but were now connected to IBM mainframes. They fulfilled an important function for the bank, but not the real-time function that had originally been envisaged.
Barclays' merger with Martins in 1969 had increased the size of its branch network and the heterogeneity of its technology, exacerbating existing difficulties. However, the merger also offered Barclays a way out of its predicament publicly and with some semblance of grace; an internal memo listed it as one of the external factors responsible for the ongoing project delay. 80 This internal memo formed the basis for a public response when Barclays' real-time project leader was interviewed by the Financial Times. The newspaper reported this explanation for continuing project delays:
[T]he major setback could be traced to the merger with Martin's [sic] Bank. Prior to that merger, things were going smoothly and Barclays expected to have completed its huge 3,000+ branch network all linked to a giant Burroughs B-8500 computer costing £4m. 81 The merger also offered Barclays closure. Although from the outside the merger appeared to be a takeover of Barclays by Martins, in the computing division, the merger was experienced as more of a takeover of Barclays by Martins. 32 Among those from Martins taking up senior positions in Barclays was Warwick Broadbent, who was appointed head of Barclays computing department. 82 With a Martins manager now in charge of the merged bank's computing division, there was a chance for this new broom to sweep things clean. Combined, the two banks were running computers manufactured by five different suppliers, all purchased in the span of a decade. Broadbent's job was to rationalize these assets. Replacing the Burroughs' computers with IBM machines, it was argued, was the rational thing to do. By 1974, all the Burroughs computers been removed from Willesden. 83 Barclays confessed to losing £4 million on the project-the original order price of the B8500-which Margaret Ackrill and Leslie Hannah, authors of the bank's official history, suggest the bank put down to experience. 84 Elsewhere, the Midland and Barclays estimated between them that the Burroughs real-time project had cost £16 million in lost savings. 85 Barclays might have reached closure publicly, but privately those working closest to the Burroughs machines couldn't understand the decision to cancel the project. Those left in the Barclays' Burroughs programming team were reluctant to give up on the project and insisted they were on the verge of a working real-time system. Decades later, they still struggle to explain its demise. A number of the team felt let down by senior managers and maintained that given six more months they could have delivered the system the bank deserved. Many of those involved couldn't understand why the project had been shelved after they had come so far. 86 Looking back and searching for explanations, the majority view of those who worked on the system was that Burroughs' real-time technology was simply ''too far ahead of its time. '' 87 Barclays' official history concurs and suggests that senior management attributed no blame to anyone inside the bank for the Burroughs affair. 88 Many years on, this is still a sensitive issue, but my research suggests that notions of blame at the time weren't entirely absent. Whether it was a matter of causation or correlation, the innovators from the technical team were given research roles or moved to other areas away from the operational frontline.
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Conclusion
The pursuit of real-time accounting for three of the British banks occurred alongside batch-oriented accounting and was influenced by several factors, none of which was the contemporaneous introduction of ATMs. Rather, the need was constructed from a combination of manufacturer marketing, enforced change due to decimalization, and the allure of a technical ideal. It is perhaps because this episode was considered one best forgotten, according to Barclays' official history, 84 that the failure of real-time computing in banking in the 1960s has been written out of the history of computing.
Graeme Gooday and Kenneth Lipartito both warn historians against preserving binary distinctions between success and failure. 89 ''Failure'' was certainly not a category used by the actors involved in this case. Archival material in Barclays Group Archives made no mention of project failure, and the closest any of the interviewees came to talking of the project in terms of a failure was referring to another project in the same breath as ''another failure.'' I do not wish to debate notions of the project's success and failure, but conclude by considering whether it is possible to deem the project's unsuccessful outcome as something more than a necessary lesson for those involved at all levels of the project.
Lipartito see both failures and non-failures as ''socially resonant'' and capable of shaping future options. 90 The explanation given by those in the community of practice working close to the machine was echoed by the wider rhetoric of real time. At a macro level, the demise of the Barclays-Burroughs real-time project did not weaken the desire for realtime banking technology and the cashless society; it merely modified the parameters required for its success. Commentating on the episode, the British banking journal, The Banker, concluded that:
Until stores, garages and so on each have terminals on-line, real-time to the same computer system as the banks [,] cheques and credits outstanding with them will distort the condition of individual accounts [ . . .] The distortion is all the more evident if other banks are not participating in the system. This said, all the British clearing banks would agree that real-time will be a feature of the financial system sometime in the future, but when planned and implemented on a national scale rather than when introduced piecemeal by individual financial institutions. 91 The Banker did not call into question the idea of real-time banking, just how and when it might happen. The end of the BarclaysBurroughs' real-time project signified a change in the technological path leading toward real-time banking and the cashless society. It was not declared a dead end; it just needed someone else to find the way. It was left to the savings banks, devoid of the temporal distortions of checks and the clearing system, to pioneer real-time computing for British banking in the 1970s. 92 
